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ABSTRACT
The federal personal tncorae Cax allows married couples to split
their income and be taxed as if each spouse earned half the income. As
a result of income splitting, the first dollar a married woman earns
working outside the home is taxed at the same marginal tax rate as the
last dollar earned by her husband. This study uses data extracted from
the 1979 Michigan Survey of Income Dyanmics to test the effect of income
splitting on the labor force participation of wives. The results of
the probit estimation show that a move away from income splitting would
significantly increase the labor force participation probabilities of
married women.

THE EFFECT OF INCOME SPLITTING ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
In the "nicsd States, the federal personal income tax of 1913 adopted
the individual as the unit of taxation. It was not until 1948 that in-
come splitting was introduced into the income tax. Under income split-
ting, the incomes of the husband and wife are added together for tax
purposes and taxed as if each spouse earned half the income. In prac-
tice, this is accomplished through the joint return whose brackets are
twice as wide as those of the single return.
The introduction of income splitting gave a major tax advantage to
married couples who found their tax liabilities substantially less than
those of single persons with the same incomes. Under pressure from
single voters. Congress changed the tax law in 1969 to lower the tax
rate on single persons so that the tax liability of a single taxpayer
is never greater than 120 percent of the liability of a married couple
of similar economic standing. Since married couples were not given the
privilege of filing as single persons if they so choose, married couples
with two earners often found their tax liabilities higher than they
would have been had it been possible for them to file as singles. This
difference in tax liability, known as the marriage penalty, can reach
as high as $4,800 in the highest tax bracket.
The practice of income splitting raises questions of equity and ef-
ficiency. If the objective of tax policy is to tax equals equally, then
horizontal tax equity Is achieved with income splitting if one defines
equals in terms of married couples rather than single individuals. This
implies that married couples should be considered the basic economic
unit. However, since single persons have opportunities similar to those
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of married couples to live together and pool their incomes, some would
argue that horizontal tax equity is better achieved under a system of
individual taxation. A growing literature explores this interesting
2
area of tax equity.
The efficiency of income splitting has bean called into question
with respect to both the marriage decision and the labor supply decision.
Income splitting appears to be nonneutral with respect to the marriage
decision. If one views marriage in the Becker (1973) framework, the
gains from marriage are positive under the current income tax, assuming
you marry an impecunious person. The gains become negative, the more
equally distributed the income of the potential marriage partners. The
empirical importance of this tax incentive has not been tested to date.
The effect of income splitting on labor supply has received little
attention in the literature. The only study addressing this question Is
by Rosen (1976) in which he calculates the gain in welfare and efficiency
from a move away from joint filing. Rosen uses 1967 data from the
National Longitudinal Survey for women ages 30-44 years to estimate an
hours worked equation. He finds hours worked to be highly responsive to
the marginal tax rate, leading to large efficiency gains from a move
away from joint filing. He also finds that high income families benefit
most from eliminating joint filing.
The present study focuses on another dimension of the labor supply
decision, labor force participation. Although the majority of married
women today work outside the home, the decision whether or not to enter
the labor force, whether or not to specialize in home production when
children are young, and whether or not to reenter the labor force when
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children are grown are still important decisions for women. Under in-
come spliccing, the first dollar a woman earns working outside the home
is taxed at the same marginal tax rate as the last dollar earned by her
husband. Consequently, income splitting has a potentially important
effect on the labor force participation of married women. The purpose
of this study is to measure the importance of this effect.
This study uses data from the 1979 Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics
to estimate a labor force participation function for married women.
Probit analysis is used to estimate the probability that a woman works
outside the home given various tax and non-tax influences. A two-stage
procedure developed by Heckman (1979) is employed to impute a wage to
women who do not work in the market. The results of the probit estima-
tion are used to calculate the probability of working outside the home
with and without income splitting. The implications for tax policy and
directions for future research are discussed.
I. The Model
In the absence of taxation, a person decides whether or not to par-
ticipate in the labor market by comparing the market wage with the reser-
vation or shadow wage. The reservation wage is the minimum market wage
necessary to induce a person to work positive hours and reflects the
monetary value of time in the home when all time is spent at home. If
the market wage exceeds or equals the reservation wage, it is optimal
for the person to work outside the home. Otherwise, the person will
choose not to participate in the labor market. As seen in Figure 1,
the reservatJ.on wage depends on the slope of the indifference curve at
zero hours of work with a given nonlabor income.
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Figure 1 The Labor Force Participation Decision
Income
u<--- .--
Reservation
wage
."'J. ,; VLiCl-.J. •
Actual wage
Nonlabor
income
K Hours of
leisure
The reservation wage is the absolute value of the slope of the in-
difference curve at zero hours of work or K hours of leisure. If
the reservation wage exceeds the actual wage, the person will not
participate in the labor force.
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An income tax modifies the labor force participation decision through
its effect on both the market wage and on the reservation wage. If the
income tax taxes earnings, it reduces the disposable wage rate by a
factor equal to one minus the marginal tax rate. If the income tax
taxes nonlabor income, it reduces nonlabor income by the same factor,
lowering the reservation wage if leisure is a normal good. Since the
effect of the income tax is to lower both the actual and the reservation
wage, the resulting effect of the tax on labor force participation cannot
be determined a priori . Empirical evidence is needed.
In our model, we assume that the earned income of the husband is
fixed and independent of the behavior of the wife. Although not true
in some families, this is a common assumption in labor supply research.
The welfare of a representative family is defined by the following
utility function:
U = U(Y^ + w^CiC - L^) + N - T, L^)
where Y is the earned income of the husband, w the hourly wage of the
wife, K is the time endowment, L^ is the leisure of the wife, N is non-
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work income, and T is the tax function. Assuming income splitting, the
tax function can be written:
T = T(Y. + w^(K - L„) + N)
whose slope, T' , is the marginal tax rate. The utility function is as-
sumed convex with positive first derivatives with respect to income and
leisure, U and U , and negative second derivatives.
L u
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The first order condition for utility niaximization Is:
-(1 - T')w2Uy +
'^l i.
with equality holding when there is an interior solution. Setting the
wife's leisure, L^, equal to the time endowment, K, and solving for the
wage yields the reservation wage, w :
R
w
R
U^(Y^ + N - T, K)
(1 - T')\]^(Y^ + N - T, K)
where the hats over the tax variables indicate that they are evaluated
at zero hours of work; that is, at L = K. Hence, T = T(Y + N) and
T' = T'(Y + N) are the tax and the marginal tax rate on the sum of the
husband's earnings and nonwork income, respectively.
The wife will participate in the labor market if her market wage
is greater than or equal to the reservation wage:
if w > w
, then LFP = 1
and
if w < w , then LFP =
Z R
where LFP is the probability of labor force participation by the wife.
Thus, the labor force participation function for wives can be
written:
LFP = f(w^(l - T'), Y + N - T, Z)
where Z is a set of taste and preference variables. We expect labor
force participation to be positively related to the disposable wage rate
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and negatively related to after-tax income. The problems of estimating
the LFP function are discussed in the next section.
II. Estimation Problems
In this study, multivariate probit analysis is used to estimate the
parameters of the LFP model. The use in earlier studies of ordinary
least squares in estimating a model with a dichotoraous dependent var-
iable leads to inconsistent estimates that may fall outside the zero-one
interval required by utility theory. The probit technique yields con-
sistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the probability param-
4
eters.
A major problem in applying probit analysis to the labor force par-
ticipation decision is that the wage variable, w„ , is not observed for
wives not in the labor market, and for those in the labor market, the
wage variable may be observed with error. A first line of approach is
to estimate a wage function of the form:
w^ = g(X)
where X is a set of variables such as age, education, and experience
that explain the wage. Using ordinary least squares to estimate this
equation and then using the estimated equation to impute a wage to all
women in the sample is a common practice, but leads to biased estimates
of the wage because of selectivity bias.
This study adopts a two-stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979)
which provides a computationally efficient way of solving the problem of
selectivity bias. As a first step, a probit estimate is made of:
-8-
LFP = f(X, Y + N - T, Z)
and the residuals from this equation are used to compute a probit -\
which is known as the inverse of the Mill's ratio. Then the following
subsample regression is estimated for employed wives:
w^ = g(X, A).
This estimation can then be used to impute a wage to each wife in the
sample and the probit technique can be used to estimate the LFP func-
tion. This approach yields consistent and asymptotically efficient
parameter estimates.
The data for the estimation were drawn from the 1979 Michigan Survey
of Income Dynamics. Only taxpaying white households were selected for
the estimation. Excluded from the sample were female headed households,
unmarried households, and households in which the wife was not present.
Further exclusions were made if the household head was over 60 years or
less than 18 years of age, unemployed, receiving transfer payments, or
had negative taxable income. This reduced the sample size to 1,465
households.
The dependent variable, labor force participation of the wife, was
set equal to one if the wife's annual hours of work were greater than
100 and equal to zero otherwise. The other variables were defined in
the usual way. The wife's pretax wage rate, which was input to the two-
stage estimation process, was available for working wives as average
hourly earnings. Education was measured as number of years of school,
age was measured in years, experience as the number of years worked
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since age 13, and the niraber of children was given by age brackets.
The husband's earnings plus noniabor income was computed by subtracting
the wife's earnings from total fanily income.
A measurement problem arose with respect to the tax variables, T
and T' , since these are not observed except in families where L- = K;
that is, in families where the wife does not work outside the home.
Data on the family's federal personal income tax liability and marginal
tax rate were used to estimate the tax liability and tax rate as a func-
tion of family taxable income, number of dependents, and whether or not
the family owns a house. The results of this estimation are shown in
Table 1. Taxable income is by far the most important determinant of
tax liability and marginal tax rate. Dependents and homeownership both
lead to a lower tax liability. The tax functions were used to impute
T and T' to each household by setting taxable income equal to the sum
of the husband's earnings and nonlabor income.
III. Results
The two-step procedure followed in this study first involved using
multivariate problt analysis to estimate a linearized version of the LFP
function. The parameters of the probit estimation were then used to
adjust the wage equation for selectivity bias. Finally, the wage equa-
tion was used to impute a wage to each woman in the sample, and the
probit estimation was repeated using the imputed wage as one of the ex-
planatory variables.
The results of the first probit estimation are shown in Table 2.
The variable "other after-tax income" is the sum of the husband's earn-
ings plus nonwork income minus the tax on this amount. Using earlier
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Table 1 The Tax Functions (t-ratios in parentheses)
Federal Income
Variable Tax Liability Marginal Tax Elate
Constant -2594.6 11.390
(-9,912) (20.666)
-3
Taxable Income .315 .873x10
(32.685) (43.023)
Number of dependents -429.0 -.656
(-7.310) (-5.311)
Home ownership -1231.3 ,912
(-6.114) (2.066)
Income squared .190x10 —
(8.077)
Dependents x income .010 —
(5.659)
Home ownership x income .038 —
(4.525)
2
R .961 .890
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Table 2 ProbiC Estimate of the Probability of Labor Force
Participation, Unadjusted
Variables
Constant
Other after-tax
income ($000)
Age
Education
Experience
Experience squared
Children 1-2
Children 3-5
Children 6-13
Children 14-17
Maximum Likelihood Estimate t-ratio
1.291 4.393
-.OlA ., ^ -4.119
-.060 -11.532
.082 4.302
.142 8.508
-.002
. t
-3.840
-.707 -8.624
-.533 -7.033
-.090 -2.029
.044 .630
Minus two times log likelihood 362.026
Critical Chi-squared (cs = .05) 16.92
-12-
Cermiaology, this variable equals Y, + N - T. The next four variables,
age, education, experience, and experience squared, are entered to proxy
for the wage, while the children variables capture the important in-
fluence of children on the labor force participation of married women.
The major purpose of this estimation was to calculate X which was then
used to adjust the wage equation.
Together with A , the explanatory variables in the wage equation are
age, education, experience, and experience squared. The results of the
ordinary least squares estimation appear in Table 3. As the results
show, education and experience both have a positive influence on the
wife's wage, although the magnitude of the experience effect declines
with increasing experience. The estimation also shows that older wives
can expect a lower wage.
The coefficient of the probit X in the wage equation turns out to
be positive and significantly different from zero, testifying to the
importance of selectivity bias in estimating a wage only over working
wives. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that working
women on the average receive higher wage offers than do nonworking women.
The wage equation with A equal to zero was used to impute a wage to each
woman in the sample. The imputed wage was adjusted by one minus the
marginal tax rate, T' , and then entered as an explanatory variable in
the final probit estimation.
The final probit results are presented in Table 4. The results con-
firm our expectation that the labor force participation of married women
is positively related to their disposable wage rate and negatively re-
lated to other after-tax income. In addition to the economic variables.
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Table 3 OLS Estimate of the Hourly Wage Rate
Variable Coefficient t-ratio
Constant -4.156 -5.782
Age -.036 -2.176
Education .656 14.193
Experience .202 3.924
Experience Squared -.003 -1.904
Probit X 1.372 3.130
R^ .208
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TabLe 4 Probit Estimate of the Probability ot Labor Force
Participation, Adjusted
Variable Maximum Likelihood Estimate t-ratio
uonstanc
Wife's imputed
disposable wage
Other after-tax
income ($000)
Children 1-2
Children 3-5
Children &-13
Children 14-17
-.173
.382
-.014
-.510
-.372
-.069
-.090
-1.369
11.753
-4.380
-6.788
-5.160
-1.604
-1.395
Minus two times log likelihood 263.261
Critical Chi-squared (a = .05) 12.59
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the number and ages of children are also shown to be important influences
on the labor force participation decision. As expected, younger children
have a larger negative effect on participation than do school age children.
Teenage children do not appear to have a significant effect on the wife's
working.
The log likelihood ratio, reported at the bottom of the table, pro-
vides a test of the significance of the explanatory variables as a group.
Since minus two times the log likelihood ratio is greater than the criti-
cal Chi-squared, we can conclude that the set of explanatory variables
has predictive power in explaining labor force participation.
IV. The Effect of Income Splitting
The impact of taxation on the labor force participation of wives
can be inferred from the results presented in Table 4, The higher the
tax rate on the first dollar the woman earns, the lower her disposable
wage, and the lower the probability of her participating in the labor
market. Further, the greater the tax on her husband's earnings and
nonwork income, the lower other after-tax income, and the greater the
probability of labor force participation. A tax system placing a heavier
tax burden on other Income and taxing the wife's first dollar earned at
a lower rate would encourage the labor force participation of wives.
As already pointed out, income splitting results in the first dollar
earned by the wife being taxed at the husband's highest bracket rate.
Moving to a system of individual filing would lower the tax rate on the
wife's first dollar earned to the first bracket rate or 14 percent. To
see the effect of this on labor force participation, we computed the
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probabilicy of labor force participation using the coefficients of
Table 4, first, assuming income splitting and, second, assuming indi-
vidual taxation. The results for three alternative wage rates are
shown in Table 5.
As seen in the table, the probability of labor force participation
by wives is significantly greater without income splitting than with in-
come splitting. When the wife's gross wage is S4.00, for example,
eliminating income splitting increases the probability of her working
from .430 to .610. According to the results of this study, eliminating
income splitting would increase female labor force participation and
Q
enhance the efficiency with which tax dollars are collected.
In recent years, there as been a strong trend among OECD countries
away from family taxation and towards individual taxation. As of 1977,
individual taxation was allowed in 17 OECD countries and compulsory in
9
13. In this country, tax reform has taken the form of a deduction for
two-earner families. The tax act of 1981 allows couples a tax deduction
equal to 5% of the first $30,000 of earnings of the spouse with the
lower earnings in calendar year 1982. In 1933 and thereafter, the de-
duction increases to 10%. The deduction, by lowering the effective tax
rate on the first dollar earned by the wife, encourages labor force par-
ticipation, although at the current deduction level, the effect is
minimal.
Many considerations other than efficiency are important in ultimately
deciding between income splitting and individual taxation. In addition
to the equity question, legal and administrative problems are involved
with a change to individual taxation. Income splitting was introduced
-17-
Table 5 The Probability of Labor Force Participation With
and Without Income Splitting
Probability of Labor Force Participation
Wife's Gross wage With Inccine Splitting Without Income Splitting
$3.00 .147 .282
$4.00 .430 .610
$5.00 .713 .938
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in 1948 partially because families living in community property states
could effectively split their incomes and lower their tax liabilities.
A successful income tax on individuals would depend on the enactment of
legislation providing taxation of income according to economic origin.
Another concern with individual taxation is the allocation of non-
labor income (dividends, interest, and profits) between the spouses.
Transfers of property could be used to reduce tax liabilities, although
it is difficult to know whether this effect would be important. One
possibility would be to attribute nonlabor income to the spouse with the
higher earnings, it could be allocated in proportion to earned income,
or it could be divided equally. In Canada, where there is individual
filing, either spouse may declare the income of jointly held assets.
An evaluation of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper,
V. Future Research
On the basis of a probit model of labor force participation, this
study concluded that labor force participation of married women could
be increased by elimination of income splitting and a return to indi-
vidual taxation. As with all econometric studies, simplifying assump-
tions were made that could affect the model and its conclusions. Re-
laxing these assumptions suggests some directions for future research.
One assumption which greatly simplified the analysis was the assump-
tion that the husband's labor supply is exogenous and independent of the
wife's work decision. This assumption permits the use of single equa-
tion estimation techniques where simultaneous estimation would otherwise
be required. While there is little current empirical evidence that the
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husband's labor supply depends on the wife's, this may change in the
future and suggests the need for further exploration.
Another simplification of the present study was to focus exclusively
on the personal income tax and to disregard all other tax and transfer
programs. This was done in part because of the uncertainty surrounding
the incidence of various programs, and in part to avoid the problem of
nonconvexities in the budget set. Hausman (1980) has shown that non-
convexities created by programs such as AFDC imply that a unique reser-
vation wage no longer exists. Analysis requires that the labor force
participation model be extended to include wage and hour combinations
rather than hours alone. Using maximum likelihood techniques, Hausman
estimated a labor force participation model for black female headed
households. He found that nonconvexities in the budget set cause serious
estimation problems, suggesting another area for future research.
Finally, the interdependence of labor force participation and other
family decisions need to be recognized. Decisions such as the timing
and spacing of children, investment in human capital, and savings deci-
sions are clearly not independent of the labor supply decision. While
the present study does not address these issues, it is hoped that it
provides a basis for additional research in the area.
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FootnoCes
See Mcincyre and OldTnan (1977) for a calculation of the narrlage
penalty at different income levels.
9
"See Rosen (1977), Brazer (1980), Munnell (1980), aad Mclntyre
(1930) for a discussion of the issues.
3
Leisure includes all types of nonmarket activities such as home
production, volunteer work, education, as well as recreation.
4
See Goldberger (1964) pp. 248-51 for a discussion of the problems
of estimating a model with a dichotomous dependent variable.
A =
-r^jTT-rT- where f and F are, respectively, the density and distri-
^2^2
bution functions for the standard normal random variable and Z = —
See Theil (1971), p. 385. ^^
The probabilities were computed for a hypothetical mean woman with
?18,108 of other after-tax income, .25 children ages 1-2, .24 children
ages 3-5, .54 children ages 6-13, and .25 children ages 14-17. The
marginal tax rate on the last dollar earned by the husband was 26% with
income splitting and 14% without.
8
This assumes that it is not a goal of social policy to discourage
the labor force participation of wives. It also assumes that jobs will
be available for those who seek to join the labor force.
9
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1977), p. 15.
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